Denver Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 1 Symposium - Riots and the Law

Article 18

January 1969

Riot Control Legislation: A Necessary Evil
Daniel Schoedinger

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Daniel Schoedinger, Riot Control Legislation: A Necessary Evil, 46 Denv. L.J. 152 (1969).

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

RIOT CONTROL LEGISLATION:

A NECESSARY EVIL
INTRODUCTION

Asmany of the other articles in this issue have suggested, the

only true solution to the problem of riots and other racial
disorders is the elimination of the root causes of racial tension. To
this author's way of thinking, riots are a fruit of racial prejudice,
a state of mind. Prejudice is outwardly manifested in the wide variety
of forms of discrimination which appear in American society today
and which have been discussed at some length in other articles in
this issue. To be sure, the government has placed, and undoubtedly
will continue to place, legal limitations and restraints on discriminatory practices.' Unfortunately, since prejudice exists only in the
mind, it has been and will continue to be impossible to cleanse the
nation of all prejudice and discrimination with one whisk, or for
that matter, a multitude of whisks, of the legislative or judicial
broom. Ridding the country of prejudice will be a painfully slow
process. Consequently, there remains the ugly reality of possible
racial disorders in the years to come.
Once the possibility of rioting is admitted, the only logical
conclusion is that a comprehensive program for riot control is
needed. As the Kerner Commission reported: "Prevention is paramount, but the experience has shown that refusal to plan is foolhardy and can only compound the human agonies of civil outbreak."'
Although reactionary riot control plans are a distinct possibility,'
an intelligent plan can be developed if the purposes and effects of
the control measures are carefully examined.4
Essential to the sensible planning for any riot control is the
placing of riots in their proper perspective. Contrary to what the
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-b, 2204, 2205 (Supp.
2

3

1968) ; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973a-p (1965) ; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
,ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 189 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER
REPORT].

See, e.g., Virginia House Bill No. 365, § 18.1-254.10 (1968),

which would have

required authorities to arrest any persons in a riotous assembly who failed to disperse
when ordered to do so. This proposal would also have permitted authorities to form
a posse to deal with rioters when authorities merely expected a riot. Fortunately, the
final bill, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-254-8 (Supp. 1968), provides discretionary arrest
power and permits the organization of private citizens to help disperse riotous crowds
only after such crowds have formed and failed to disperse.
4 See, e.g., Setting a New Course in Meeting Race Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 8, 1968, at 38; A Crisis that Won't Go Away, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1967, at
17-22; Insurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968,
at 38.
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news media have often suggested, riots, even as serious as Watts,
Newark, and Detroit, are neither insurrection 5 nor guerilla warfare. 6
[T]he notion of an insurrection has little meaning, for snipers
have no intention or capability for holding territory, nor are they
[T]he guerilla conpart of a scheme to do so even temporarily ....
cept is also not relevant since guerillas are part of an organization,
a plan, prepare paths of withdrawal and develop
proceed with
7
sanctuaries.
The current type of riot is more an emotional outlet of the
hate and disgust which the generally law-abiding rioters' feel
toward a society which has treated them unfairly. "Riots . . . may
involve large numbers of people, many of whom are usually lawabiding . . . . [This is] because acts of rioting are irresistible elements of contagious emotion rooted in commonly shared and commonly expressed feelings of frustration and rage." Another related
fact about riots is that they are presently a much different breed
of disorder than the "race riots" of the first half of this century.1"
No longer do riots consist of violent confrontations between masses
of private black and white citizens. The confrontation is now between the authorities and black rioters bent upon looting and
destroying property. Consequently, any plan for control of rioting
should not, as some authorities have suggested, treat the riot area
as a war zone; 1 it should be treated as a part of the city in which
angry citizens are venting their emotions. "We have a very special
situation here in America. We're not just fighting an alien conspiracy; we are up against some of our own citizens . . . who have
many complaints about their lot in life."'"
A final and vitally important consideration in planning for
the control of riots should be the realization that only a very small
portion of the citizenry of a riot-torn area actively participates in
the riot. This portion has been variously estimated at between
5 Insurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEWS & 'WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968, at 38;
Kerby, Western Justice, 205 NATION 104, 105 (1967).
6Looting, Burning- Now Guerrilla War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 3, 1964, at
23; The New Kind of War, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1967, at 20.
7
M. JANOWITZ, SOCIAL CONTROL OF ESCALATED RIOTS 15 (1968).
8

CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN

THE CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING 24 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA
RIOT REPORT]; The Real Tragedy of Newark, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., July

31, 1967, at 31 (hereinafter cited as Newark].
g Conant, Rioting, Insurrection and Civil Disobedience, 37 AM. SCHOLAR 420, 430
(1968).
'0 M. JANOWITz,, supra note 7, at 9-10.
'1 G. WILLS, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 39 (1968); Kurtz in Storyville, 206 THE
NATION 196 (1968).
12
lInsurrection: Outlook in U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1968, at 41.
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2l a and 1114 percent of the population. In addition, only one out of
every four persons in the riot area approves of the rioting. 5 Therefore, riot control planners must be extremely careful to avoid the
overreaction which could harm and alienate non-participants.
With the foregoing principles in mind, the planners of riot
control can develop a more effective program which will afford
a maximum amount of riot control with the creation of a minimum
of friction between the authorities and the residents of the riot
area. Forward-looking riot control planning must necessarily consist of two elements: planning of the actions of the personnel who
will be deployed to control the riot and legislation to provide
both authority for and limitations upon the control procedures employed. This article suggests various provisions which might be
included in such legislation.
I.

SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATION

A learned student of the riots which have racked this country
in the past 5 years has suggested that riots develop in four distinct
stages. 6 The first stage consists of a precipitating incident, which
is most often an innocuous confrontation between the police and a
member of the black community. This incident, usually an arrest,
would go unnoticed except that it occurs at a time and place when
many members of a minority group are present. As these people
gather with others who have received the rapidly spreading word
of the arrest, the second stage of the riot ensues. This is a confrontation between minority agitators and more respectable minority
leaders. The former group denounces and shouts obscenities at the
white community, particularly the police, while the latter group
attempts to calm the situation. If the crowd is not dispersed peacefully, the third stage develops. It is characterized by window
breaking, rock throwing, and widely scattered looting, all carried
out by the rioters in a carefree, holiday spirit. If the authorities
turn a deaf ear to grievances or use too much force in an attempt
to suppress the rioters, the disorders will progress to the fourth
stage. This is the hard-core riot with widespread looting, destruction
of property, and incidents of sniping like that seen in Watts,
Newark, and Detroit.
A single article could not possibly survey legislation covering
all phases of riot control. Consequently, suggestions herein will
13 CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT 1.
14 KERNER REPORT

73.

15 Ransford, Attitudes of Negroes Toward the Los Angeles Riot, 3 L. IN'TRANS. Q. 191-

92 (1966).
18 Conant, supra note 9, at 420.
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concentrate on control of the third and fourth stages, emphasizing
provisions which might prevent the transition from the third to
the fourth stage.' 7
II.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

When the Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official
determines that twenty or more persons are engaged in illegal
activity which seriously threatens the public peace and safety, and
that these people cannot be controlled by usual police methods, he
may declare a state of emergency to exist in the city. Such state of
emergency shall remain in effect for a period not to exceed 2 days
after the cessation of conditions under which the state of emergency
was declared. For the duration of such state of emergency, the following emergency provisions shall be effective.

This provision is the grant of authority to invoke extraordinary
measures in the face of a developing riot situation. It involves the
admission that the riot has progressed beyond the point at which
ordinary police measures can be effective.
The fact that this provision is worded in the form of a city
ordinance granting power to a city official rather than a state
law granting power to the governor warrants comment. It may be
argued that governors, having a broader base of experience, should
be the ones to make the delicate decision of when excess police
power should be authorized. However, a city official, from a strictly
time-distance perspective, is closer to the riot. Furthermore, a
mayor will probably have a more intimate knowledge of the riot
area and of the capabilities of his own police force. For these reasons
the mayor of a riot city, rather than the governor, is the official
who should have the authority to invoke emergency powers.
Although mayors or other local officials should have the power
to declare a state of emergency, it must not be forgotten that during
a major riot cooperation and coordination of effort among local,
state, and federal officials will be vital to successful riot control.
Legislation to facilitate these efforts is discussed infra.
Although a city rather than a state official may be the best
qualified to act in a riot situation, any city which considers the
passage of a riot control ordinance must first determine whether
it has been granted such power by the state. "[M]unicipal corporations possess and can exercise such powers only as are granted by
the legislature in express words .... .. 1 Consequently, if a state
17A discussion of California's legislative effort to prevent riots from progressing from

the second stage to the third, CAL. PENAL CODE § 404.6 (West Supp. 1968), may be
found in Note, The Elements of Section 404.6 - Urging to Riot Law, 4 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 118 (1967).
18Pittsburgh, C.,C. & St. L. Ry. v. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 45 N.E. 587
(1896).
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statute does not grant to the city the requisite authority, any power
invoked by the mayor would be invalid and any action taken
pursuant thereto would be ultra vires.x9 However, state statutes
generally give cities the power either specifically to suppress riots2"
or, more generally, to preserve the peace and good order of the city. 2 '
The final consideration of this provision is whether or not
the authority to invoke extraordinary police powers violates personal
freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution. There are
three possible ways to avoid conflict with the Constitution.
The quick, extreme method for justifying excessive police
powers is a declaration of martial law. However, in an area under
martial law the authorities have the power to deny all Constitutional
rights2 2 and literally wage war against the rioters.2 8 As stated
earlier, violently suppressive measures may only add fuel to a riot
and create animosity in the minority community. Consequently, it
is hoped that the emergency powers proposed herein would be
used to control the riot before it becomes necessary to wage war in
the riot area.
At the opposite end of the scale, it has been suggested that the
present constitutional standards could be re-examined and broadened in the light of riot situations.2 " It is unlikely that some of the
extreme measures required for dealing with rioters could be brought
within the purview of normal constitutional standards, even when
expanded, without completely destroying the standards themselves.
Even if they could, such a broadening would be a dangerous precedent to set. It could very easily lead to a sliding scale of constitutional standards dependent upon the facts of each individual situation. Such standards might very well provide no protection.
The proper justification for the exercise of extraordinary police
powers lies somewhere between these two extremes. It is based on
the principal that there is a higher state interest in preserving the
peace and order of the city which will justify the usurpation of
certain constitutional rights. It is the underlying reason for limiting
the first amendment freedom of speech and expression when the
19 City of Topeka v. Huntoon, 46 Kan. 634, 26 P. 488 (1891); City of Red Wing v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 72 Minn. 240, 75 N.W. 223 (1898) ; Village of Ravenna v.
Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118, 12 N.E. 445 (1887) ; City of Waxahachie v. Missouri, K.&T. Ry., 183 S.W. 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
20
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 715.49 (Page 1953); TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art.
1015(21) (Vernon 1963).
21

MAs.

GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40

§

21 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.27.372

(1965).
2 Powers Merchantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934) ; Wilson & Co. v.
Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959) (dictum).
23
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909).
2 Note, Riot Control: The Constitutional Limits of Search, Arrest and Fair Trial Procedure, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 85 (1968).
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speech presents a "clear and present danger" to the public peace
and order.25 The higher state interest can also be seen in laws
regulating automobile traffic" and the sale of liquor.2 7 Although
there is no case which expressly permits the use of such extraordinary police powers as envisioned by this legislation, the case
of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization2 s comes very
close to doing so by way of inference. In that case union organizers
entered Jersey City, New Jersey, which had, until that time successfully avoided extensive unionization. The union began peacefully distributing union literature and encouraging workers to join
unions. Under orders from the mayor, police illegally searched
union halls, seized union handbills, and expelled union organizers
from the city. The court said: "The evidence is not entirely clear
as to how many persons came to Jersey City . . .attempting to take

part in CIO activities upon the morning of November 29th, but
an examination of it indicates that ....
[w]hat they had planned
to accomplish presented no serious threat to the peace and good
order of [the city]."," The court further stated:
The reason given by Mayor Hague and certain of the other
appellants in their testimony for such acts upon the part of the
police was the necessity of preserving peace and good order in
Jersey City and obviating the possibility of riot, strife, and injury
to the speakers and citizens of Jersey City. It in no way appears,
however, from the record before us that the police of Jersey City
would have been powerless to maintain order .... 80

These two excerpts would seem to indicate that, had there been
a real threat of an incident in which the police could not maintain
order through ordinary measures, police action violating the individual's rights would have had some justification.
The procedures provided in the following proposed sections
(A through H) are commonly employed by authorities in a time
of riot. They are mentioned here for two reasons - to emphasize
their wide use and, more importantly, to embody all powers necessary to riot control in a single city official. Persons preparing riot
control ordinances should give careful consideration to the necessity
for unified control. In this regard, one decision must be made:
Which city official is to hold the emergency powers hereinafter
proposed? The mayor,"' as the chief executive officer of the city,
25Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924).
Koplovitz v. Jensen, 197 Ind. 475, 151 N.E. 390 (1926).
People v. Frangadakis, 184 Cal. App. 2d 579, 7 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960).
- 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939).
29 Id. at 778.
30
1d. at 779.
31In some cities the chief executive officer may hold some other title such as City Manager. In any event, he is the official who should have the authority.
2

2
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is the logical choice. Likewise, who is to have the emergency
powers in the event that the mayor is absent from the city when a
riot develops? It is likely that city charters provide a city official
to be acting mayor in the mayor's absence. However, this official,
because of the nature of his regular duties, may not be the best
qualified to declare a state of emergency and exercise emergency
powers. For example, in Denver, Colorado, the deputy mayor is the
Manager of Public Works.3 1 Consequently, if nothing to the contrary were provided in a riot control ordinance, the Manager of
Public Works would possess the emergency powers in the mayor's
absence. However, either the Manager of Safety and Excise3 1 or
the Chief of Police3 4 would be better qualified to decide when to
declare a state of emergency and what powers to invoke.
A. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
suspend the sale of alcoholic beverages in the city or any part
thereof.
The reasons for this provision are readily apparent. The holiday
spirit which prevails during the third stage of a riot can only be
increased by the addition of drunken persons to the scene. 3' Furthermore, sociological studies indicate that rioters whose inhibitions are
released by intoxication 36 will be more likely to take actions which
will propel the riot from the third stage to the fourth. 7
Unfortunately, this section has one serious drawback. It may
have the least effect in the riot area where it is most needed because
liquor stores are generally among those looted.3 8 Rioters bent on
destruction and looting will not be deterred by this section. 9 However, many less eager residents of the city who would be drawn
into the riot under the influence of alcohol may not participate.
Local officials preparing an ordinance which includes this provision must determine whether the mayor has the authority to
temporarily suspend liquor licenses. In some cases, this power may
be reserved to a state official. 40 In others, a local official, other
32

CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, § A2.2-1.

33

Id. at § A9.2.
34
Id. at § A9.4.
35

KERNER REPORT 49-50.

36 E. BOGEN & L. HISEY, WHAT ABOUT ALCOHOL? 79-80 '(1934) ; E. STARLING, THE
ACTION OF ALCOHOL ON MAN 141 (1923).

37 Newark Race Riot: Open Rebellion July 24, 1967, at 6.
38

39

Just Like Wartime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,

KERNER REPORT 24; CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT 46, 47.

KERNER REPORT 49-50.

40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.25 (Page 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 501, 504
(Purdon 1952).
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than the mayor, may possess the power. 4 ' In either event, legislation
would have to be enacted to enable the official holding the power
to delegate it to the mayor when a state of emergency is declared.
B. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may:
1. Suspend the sale of gasoline and other inflammable
liquids in the city or any part thereof; and
2. Make it a misdemeanor to carry gasoline or other inflammable liquids on one's person or in a vehicle in the
city or any part thereof except such as is contained in
the gasoline tank of the vehicle.
The obvious reason for this section lies in the necessity of removing the supply of gasoline from which molotov cocktails and
other fire bombs are made. These are the popular and widespread
tools of the arsonists who have caused much damage in recent riots.4 2
However, curtailing the sale of gasoline can have other desirable
effects. It would limit civilian traffic in the riot area; thereby restricting the mobility of rioters and increasing the mobility of law
enforcement officials. It would also limit traffic in parts of the
city which are not involved in the riot. This would release more
policemen from traffic control duties for service in the riot area.
C. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may:
1. Suspend the sale of firearms, ammunition, and explosives in the city or any part thereof; and
2. Make it a misdemeanor to carry firearms, ammunition,
or explosives on one's person or in a vehicle in the city
or any part thereof except that firearmsand ammunition
may be carried by persons on their own property.
Like the provision for the suspension of the sale of alcoholic
beverages, this section may have little effect in the riot area because
of looting and overt defiance of the law. However, it could have
pronounced effects in other parts of a riot-torn city. Members of
the rioting minority who live outside the riot area might be discouraged from spreading the unrest by arming themselves. Other
persons, disgusted with the rioters or fearing that the riot might
spread, would be discouraged from forming armed groups of vigilantes to provide "protection" for their neighborhoods or to carry
out attacks on the rioting minority - a very real possibility. 43 Even
if this section does not discourage the formation of such groups,
41

CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO,

'2 KERNER REPORT 25, 27.
41

G. WILLS, supra note 11, at 57-58.

§ A9.8.

VOL. 46

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

subsection 2 will provide authority for the arrest of and confiscation
of weapons from such groups.
D. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
impose a curfew on the city or any part thereof.
This measure serves a number of very useful purposes in riot
control. In theory, at least, a curfew keeps the vast majority of
the population of the riot area, who do not participate in the riot,
off the streets. 44 It can generally be assumed that the persons in
the streets during the curfew period are the troublemakers, although
this theory may not be true in all cases. The curfew decreases the
chance of orderly bystanders being injured by police action against
rioters and avoids the possibility of police action inciting nonparticipants to join the disorder. Furthermore, the imposition of a
curfew provides a readily available and easily proven charge for
which arrests of rioters may be made - curfew violation. For these
reasons, the declaration of a curfew is a most effective measure
for riot control.
E. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
cordon off and isolate the city or any part thereof, in which event:
1. Everyone except authorities, members of the news
media, and residents of the cordoned off area may be
excluded from such area;
2. Everyone except authorities and members of the news
media may be prohibited rom leaving the cordoned
area;and
3. Any member of the news media who incites any person
to riot may be excluded from the cordoned area.
The most essential purpose of this provision is to contain the
rioters, thereby preventing the riot from spreading. In Watts and
Detroit, effective measures were not taken early in the riot to
isolate the trouble when the violence was not widespread.4" Had
those riot areas been sealed off from the remainder of their respective cities, it is quite likely that the violence, loss of life, and property damage would have been greatly decreased.
A second purpose of this section is to prevent persons outside
the riot area from entering and participating in the riot.4 6 Outside
"Conant, supra note 9, at 430; M. JANoWlTz, supra note 7, at 9-10.
5

4 KERNER REPORT 49-50; CALIFORNIA RioT REPORT 20.
4 KERNER

REPORT 74; An American Tragedy, 1967 -Detroit,

1967, at 77.

NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7,
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agitators have also been reported in the riot area.4 7 Such activity
can only increase the burden of riot control.
This will also provide protection for the residents of the area
by excluding outsiders bent on retribution. Snipers and vigilante
groups seeking to "even the score" have been uncovered in these
areas." Also, armed, self-appointed guards of riot area business
establishments have been encountered. 9 Such persons present a
serious threat to the lives of the residents of these areas, both
rioters and nonparticipants alike. Moreover, such activities by outsiders can only increase the rage of the rioting minority, thereby
increasing the task of riot conrtol.
Cordoning the area would also protect curious and unsuspecting
passers-by from being caught and beaten. ° These tragic incidents
only provide another opportunity for escalation of the riot.
As important and helpful as sealing off the area from the
remainder of the city is, it may create two serious problems. First,
residents who are employed outside the area may be prevented from
going to work. Second, because of the widespread destruction of
buildings which has often occurred during riots, many persons may
be rendered homeless.5 Cordoning may prevent these persons from
getting to friends or relatives with whom they could stay. These two
problems must be considered by local officials and provision made
for their solution if many nonrioters are not to be alienated by this
riot control measure.
It is hoped that subsection three of this section, permitting
authorities to exclude from the area newsmen who incite rioters,
would not have to be used. However, it is provided because at least
one incident has been reported in which it would have been useful.
A newsman reporting on a disturbance, repeatedly encouraged
a black youth to throw a rock at passing cars for the purpose of
being filmed by the newsman. Eventually, the newsman got his
wish.5" Such positive efforts to incite riotous conduct cannot be
tolerated. Unfortunately, there appears to be no way to prevent the
passive encouragement provided by the mere presence of the newsmen at the scene of a disturbance without curtailing news coverage
in riot areas.
47 KERNER REPORT 29-30.

48Id. at

207; G. WILLS, supra note 11, at 57-58.

49

G. WILLS, supra note 11.
50
KERNER REPORT 24; Back of Riots: Discontent, Illiteracy, Criminal Element, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 30, 1965, at 22; New York City Deep in Trouble, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 3, 1964, at 26.
1
6 KERNER REPORT 61.

52 1d. at 205.
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F. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
empower police and other authorities to order crowds of more
than five persons to disperse, and, upon failure of a cyowd, so
ordered to disperse, to arrest those failing to disperse.
It should be noted that this proposal is different from the
usual unlawful assembly statutes. 5s These statutes are employed
under ordinary circumstances to prevent riots from materializing,
and their application is limited to assemblies which are riotous or
engaging in unlawful activity. Section F is not so limited in its
applicability. Any assembly in a riot area presents a threat to the
public order.
As previously mentioned, the foregoing provisions authorize
powers which most mayors or governors presently possess or can
exercise in times of civil disorder. The following powers and restrictions are suggested as valuable additions to the present powers.
G. Deadly force may be employed by police and other authorities
to effect arrests only in the event that:
1. Deadly force is necessary to effect the arrest;
2. The criminal to be arrested poses a serious threat of
death or serious bodily harm to the arresting officer or
others;
3. The arrestingofficer can see the criminal to be arrested
and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force will
create no unreasonable danger to other persons; and
4. The arresting officer has made known his intent to arrest or reasonably believes it is known to the criminal.M
This section provides a radical departure from common law
and from some statutory provisions. Under common law, law enforcement officials are permitted to use deadly force to arrest any
person reasonably expected of having committed a felony. 5 However, deadly force may never be employed in the arrest of a suspected
misdemeanant" Some states permit more liberal use of deadly
force in riot situations. In these states officials are exonerated from
culpability for any death of a rioter or bystander which results
53

§ 2923.51 (Page Supp. 1968) ; MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.521
(1968).
5 For an excellent discussion of a similar proposal to be in effect in both riot and nonriot situations, see Rhine, 'Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 829 (1968).
55 Stinnet v. Virginia, 55 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1932) ; State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103
N.W. 944 '(1905).
58
Tuttle v. Forsberg, 331 Ill. App. 503, 73 N.E.2d 861 (1947) ; Holloway v. Moser,
193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927).
0 H1O REv. CODE ANN.
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during the dispersal of a riotous crowd.5 7 Such measures as these
cannot be realistically employed during riots without resulting in
wholesale slaughter of the type which took place in Watts, Detroit,
and Newark.
Even ignoring humanitarian arguments, widespread indiscriminate use of deadly force except under the conditions prescribed
by this section is senseless. It does not accomplish its purpose of
riot control. In one 14 block area of Watts, four rioters were killed;
yet, 37 buildings were damaged and 30 stores were looted."'
In another nine block area, three rioters were killed; yet, 35 buildings were destroyed and 39 stores were looted.5" In Detroit, it has
generally been acknowledged that the Army paratroopers, who
killed only one rioter,6 0 were far more effective in controlling the
riot than were the police and National Guardsmen 6 ' who accounted
for most of the other deaths.62
The apparent failure of deadly force to suppress riots should,
in itself, be reason enough to severely restrict its use. However, there
are three other advantageous reasons.
In the first place, deadly force, especially where unnecessary,
enrages nonparticipants as well as rioters.6 3 This can greatly increase the difficulty of post-riot reconciliation efforts.
Secondly, gunfire from authorities often ricochets for many
blocks. 64 As a result, officers blocks away from the firing often
believe themselves to be under fire from snipers, which causes them
to begin shooting back at imaginary snipers and delays their riot
65
control activities.
The third, and most important reason, is that many innocent
persons, not even part of the activity from which the shooting stems,
are killed or injured.66 Such injuries and deaths stem in part from
errant gunshots and in part from random shooting by authorities
who do not have their targets in sight. Two of the more outstanding
examples should suffice to demonstrate this point. In Atlanta, police
attempted to disperse a protest rally. As two of the officers chased
a group of black youths, a cherry bomb exploded at the officers'
feet. In response, the police fired several shots. Some of these struck
57 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 269 § 6 (West Supp. 1968) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS
(1968); REv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 9.48.160(3) (1961).
5 CALIFORNIA RIOT REPORT, app., map enclosed.
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a group of persons sitting peacefully on a front porch, killing a
man and injuring a young boy.67 In Detroit, National Guardsmen
manning a tank heard gunshots and thought themselves to be under
fire from snipers. On the suspicion of one of the guardsmen that
the fire was from an apartment building, the buliding was sprayed
with machinegun fire. A 4-year-old girl was killed and her 21-yearold aunt was critically injured.6"
Some officials, such as Mayor Daley of Chicago, have expressed
the view that all looters, arsonists, and snipers must be shot.69
Mayor Daley's feeling was that police must use firepower because
restriction of such a practice would tie the hands of police attempting
to control rioters. Such comment indicates a lack of knowledge on
the part of the officials. Use of tear gas and the more potent gas
CS has proven to be a very effective riot control measure. 70 A few
cannisters of gas have dispersed large angry crowds. Additionally,
gas can temporarily discourage would-be looters and disable escaping
looters.
Elimination of excessive use of deadly force might have a tremendous favorable psychological impact on the rioting minority
community. Ghetto residents would see that "believe it or not,
'whitey' would sooner save colored lives than white-owned buildings. "' 71 Hopefully, future riots would be lessened because minority
communities would have reason to accept the proposition that not
all whites are merely interested in exploiting minorities.
H. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
suspend the privilege of bail for all persons arrested for inciting
to riot and crimes of violence. However, reasonable bail shall
be set for all other rioters.
This provision is suggested as a sensible alternative to the bail
procedures instituted by most cities during past riots. In many cases,
astronomical bail was set even for such minor infractions as curfew
violation.7" Such unrealistic bail practices, based on the theory that
everyone even remotely connected with the riot should be kept out
of the area for the duration of the riot, led to unhealthy overcrowding of established jail facilities and use of emergency facilities
67 KERNER REPORT 36.
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70 G. WILLS, supra note 11, at 41.
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wholely unsuited for use as detention centers 78 Consequently, there
is a desperate need for a realistic bail system during riots.
This section retains the necessary controls of past systems by
permitting authorities to detain without bail those rioters who,
for lack of a better expression, may be called the hardened criminal
participants. These are the persons who have been arrested for
serious crimes such as inciting to riot, arson, and assault. There are
two reasons for detaining such persons during a riot, both of which
facilitate riot control. First, it must be assumed that any rioter
brazen enough to commit one of the serious crimes anticipated by
this section would be likely to return to participation in the riot
upon his release. Second, such rioters, by their bold defiance of
the law, may provide moral support and encouragement for the
more timid rioters. In either instance, the release of the hardened
criminal rioter would increase the burden of riot control.
While providing a necessary and sensible method for detaining
dangerous rioters, this section also attempts to avoid the creation of
the problems of the past by requiring that reasonable bail be set
for persons arrested for minor violations. The persons so treated
would be largely petty looters, curfew violators, and members of
crowds who failed to disperse when ordered to do so. These people
would be caught up in and carried along by the holiday spirit of
the riot rather than actually fomenting the riot. They are, therefore,
unlikely to rejoin the riot after their release.14 Much would be accomplished by taking these people off the streets for a short time
to make them aware of their wrongdoing until they can be released
on bail. Such a practice would have the advantage of providing a
cooling-off period without the disadvantage of forcing minor rioters
experience which
to remain indefinitely in overcrowded jails -an
could only increase hostility toward the police. This practice would
have the added advantage of reducing the number of rioters detained
75
to a workable volume.
Unfortunately, this procedure cannot eliminate the problems
of temporary overcrowding and delays in bail hearings caused by
76
the great increase in influx of arrestees during riots.
I. Search and seizure:
1. A warrantmay be issued authorizinga reasonablesearch
of an area of the city limited to four blocks upon the
3Id. at 182-85.
1d. at 185.
75
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reasonable suspicion of a policeman that the area holds
a named fugitive or specified weapons, explosives, or
incendiarydevices.
2. Police may stop and search in a reasonablemanner any
person or vehicle without a warrant or probable cause.
This provision is suggested with much hesitation for the
reason that it might be used to justify a search of the type which
was conducted in Plainield, New Jersey, in the summer of 1967.
During the riot which took place in that city, 46 carbines were
stolen from an arms manufacturer and were reportedly distributed
in the riot area. When the carbines were not turned over to authorities pursuant to an agreement between city officials and black
leaders, a house-by-house search of the black ghetto was ordered.
A massive convoy of Plainfield police, New Jersey State Police
and National Guardsmen carried out the search which uncovered
none of the missing carbines. Instead, ghetto homes were left in
shambles which added to the bitterness in the black community.7 7
Another inflamatory and completely unnecessary practice for
which this section might be used would be to justify the harassment
of ghetto residents. During the riot in Newark, two black residents
of the riot area were returning from a grocery store with bags of
food which they had purchased. An unmarked car stopped beside
the two men, and five policemen got out. Accusing the two of being
looters, the policemen threw the bags of groceries onto the ground
and kicked their contents into the street. The police then drove
78
away.
Such practices as mentioned above serve no useful purpose in
riot control and can only further enrage rioters and nonrioters alike.
However, during a riot, authorities may need extraordinary search
and seizure power. Section I authorizes much broader search and
seizure powers than are normally permissible. Under nonriot conditions, authorities are required to have probable cause before they
can search a building for contraband or a fugitive, or stop an individual and search him for contraband.79 While the power granted
here is not an absolute power, it does greatly reduce the evidentiary
standard required to justify a search to that required in ordinary
situations to justify a stop and frisk.80 An even greater power is
granted to stop and search individuals and vehicles. Here no justification for the search is required, the search authorized is limited
to that which is reasonable.
7 Newark, supra note 8, at 31.
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J. Censorship.
The possibility of granting local officials either the broad
power to censor all riot news to be released to the public from the
riot area or the more limited power to censor only news concerning
the riot to be released by the news media into the riot area has been
considered and rejected. These measures would provide a means
of preventing the spread of inflamatory stories in the riot area.
These stories could provide the incentive for nonrioters to participate in the civil disorders. Although such authorizations might
occasionally be useful, they would at best accomplish little. At their
worst, such authorizations would provide the basis for the wholesale extinguishment of the freedom of the press.
The grant of censorship power to local officials was considered because the conclusion has been reached that many reports
of past riots were untrue, exaggerated, or inflammatory. Examples
may be cited to support this conclusion.
One newspaper editor admitted that he wished his paper had
not printed some of the stories which it carried during the riots.
These were reports of "sniper kings" and "nests of snipers."'"
In Tampa, Florida, a deputy sheriff died during the riot. It
was immediately reported that he was killed by rioters. Not until
later did the true story emerge that he had been stricken by a heart
attack.8 2
A major newspaper reported a story of Michigan National
Guardsmen storming a house in Detroit under heavy sniper fire to
capture three shaggy-haired white youths. The report stated that
large stores of arms and ammunition found in the house had been
used to supply snipers over the entire West Side. In fact, guardsmen
had attacked the house in response to the malicious accusations of
the evicted tenants that snipers were in the house. The three persons
captured were the owner of the house, his brother, and a friend who
had taken over the house to prevent the evicted tenants from returing and to protect it from rioters. The only weapon which the
three had was a small rifle to protect themselves.8 3
During the Watts riot, a public meeting between members of
the black community and city officials was held after the initial
outbreak of the riot but before the worst violence erupted. Many very
responsible remarks were made by leaders on both sides including
a plea for calm by the mother of the youth whose arrest had triggered
the riot. However, the greatest news coverage was given to a black
81
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youth who unexpectedly seized the microphone and told everyone
that he and his friends intended to raid white neighborhoods that
evening.84
At the time of the riot in Cincinnati, several sources reported
the arrest of white youths for possession of a bazooka. Few mentioned that the weapon was inoperable.85
Although stories such as those mentioned above can only serve
to increase racial tensions by enraging whites as well as blacks,
it is unlikely that the grant of a censorship power to local officials
would provide the means for truly solving the problem. The reason
is that many of the inflammatory rumors reported during past riots
were given to reporters by local officials who had inadequate communication with their riot control personnel."8
Even if censorship would assure that only true and uninflammatory news of the riot would be reported, the mere news that
censorship had been imposed would create another problem. The
black community is generally hostile toward and places little faith
in the news media. The feeling is that the news media are simply
tools of the white establishment." This feeling is -more pronounced
during riots when blacks believe that the news media fail to adequately report incidents of police brutality or of ghetto residents
helping firemen.88 News of the imposition of censorship could only
increase these beliefs.
The more sensible solution to the problem would appear to
be to encourage the news media to improve the quality of their
reporting. The results of a meeting of representatives in all fields
of reporting indicate that news reporters are making this effort.8 9
K. Local police, state police, National Guardsmen, and federal
soldiers and law enforcement officers deployed in the city may
be deputized, so that they shall have the same powers as the
police of this city.
This provision is an attempt to alleviate a serious problem
which has developed when a number of jurisdictions have provided
law enforcement personnel in a single city. These officers have been
without authority to arrest except for violations of laws of their
own jurisdictions.9 This has meant that National Guardsmen have
84
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generally been without authority to arrest unless martial law has
been declared. Also, police from cities surrounding the riot area
have authority to arrest only for crimes proscribed by state law.
Consequently, much effort to control riots has been rendered ineffective by the inability of National Gaurdsmen and non-local
police to make arrests unless accompanied by a state policeman or
policemen from the riot city. By giving all law enforcement personnel
authority to arrest, the number of active riot controllers would be
greatly increased.
L. The Mayor or, in his absence from the city, a city official may
appoint members of the local bar to serve as municipal judges,
public defenders, and prosecutors.
This proposal is an effort to relieve the logjams which have
plagued courts during previous riots. This overcrowding has increased the difficulty of successful prosecution"' and has eliminated
92
If
the possibility of fair and expeditious treatment of arrestees.

rioters are not to lose all respect for the law, justice must be properly meted out. Guilty persons must be convicted, and innocent
people must be quickly released. Only a great increase in the
number of judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors can assure
that the ends of justice will be served by the courts during riots.
This section, like Section A, requires a determination by local
authorities of whether the mayor has the requisite power under
state and local law. If he does not, changes in state and local law
will be necessary before this section will be effective.
M. Sanctions for abuse of emergency powers:
1. Upon a finding by the Mayor that a police officer or
public official has abused any emergency power granted
by this ordinance, such police officer, or public official
shall be relieved of his duties permanently or for a
93
lesser period as the Mayor may determine.
2. This section shall in no way limit criminal sanctions or
civil remedies against police officers who abuse the
powers granted in this ordinance.
Because very broad extraordinary powers are granted in this
proposed ordinance, this section is necessary to discourage overzealous police conduct and to punish it when it occurs. Undoubtedly,
91 Id. at 184.
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some (notably policemen) will argue that this section will hamper
police riot control activities because the threat of suspension will be
foremost in the minds of all riot controllers. However, police conduct
must conform to statutory standards, especially when police possess
powers to violate individuals' rights. Furthermore, the sanction
provided in this section would not be applied in cases where a policeman would be culpable only under a very strict interpretation of
the power which he abused. This limitation is consistent with [he
4
judicial interpretation of §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.
Subsection 2 is proposed in order to make it clear that all
criminal sanctions and civil remedies are also available when emergency powers are abused. For killing a bystander while shooting at
a sniper or an arsonist, a policeman might be guilty of manslaughter.
For killing an escaping looter, a police officer might be guilty of
murder. For making an unreasonable search of the type reputed to
have been made in Plainfield,9 5 a policeman might be liable for
damages under §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.6 These are only
a few of the criminal and civil remedies available against police
abuse of emergency powers.
No penalties or punishments are suggested here because they
are not properly within the scope of this article. By the time a rioter
can be tried, convicted, and punished, the riot in which he participated is history. The only riot control purpose which punishment of
rioters can serve is as a deterrent to prospective rioters. The likelihood that punishment would have such an effect is small. In the
holiday spirit of a riot most participants are generally law-abiding,97
but are caught up in the excitement of the event and do not consider
the illegality or the consequences of their activities. The other rioters,
who have previous criminal records, have demonstrated that they
are undeterred by the prospect of being punished for their crimes.
Consequently, it is doubtful that punishment for violation of any
of the proposed sections would have a significant effect on riot
control.
REFLECTIONS

This proposal is written in light of the riots which have occurred
in black ghettos in the past 5 years, and the factual references are
drawn from those riots. This is not to say that the applicability of
this proposal is limited to riots by blacks. There are many other
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), construed in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) ; Bowens
v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
96 Newark, supra note 8, at 31.
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minorities which face the same problems which have so enraged
blacks. Consequently, these groups are likely to display their discontent in the same manner. Furthermore, some provisions of this
proposal may be useful in controlling student demonstrations. Although student riots develop in a different manner from riots by
minority groups, and the violence wrought by students is of a
different nature, the students are motivated by the same disenchantment with the society in which they live.
As valuable as legislation as this may be in riot control, its
effect will be severely limited if there is no cooperation among
neighboring municipalities. If adjacent cities do not have and invoke
provisions similar to those in force in the riot city, rioters and nonrioters alike need only cross a city line to avoid such provisions as
restrictions on the sale of gasoline, firearms, and alcoholic beverages.
Furthermore, the sanctions against police abuse of power can only
apply to the policemen of the city which has invoked the ordinance.
Since police from surrounding cities often aid in riot control, such
police would not face the sanctions provided unless the cities from
which they come have similar provisions.
The passage of legislation similar to that proposed here would
go a long way toward providing a city with a comprehensive plan
for riot control. Such legislation would provide cities with authority
to carry out activities essential to effective riot control. In addition,
it would provide some standards for police conduct. These standards
are vitally necessary to assure that riot control measures are not so
suppressive that they incite, rather than control rioters.
Unfortunately, however, riot control legislation is not the
answer to riot control in itself. No amount of legislation can positively control the actions of individual riot control personnel on the
streets. Furthermore, if steps are not taken to eradicate the prejudice
and discriminatory practices which breed riots, no amount of legislation or preparation for riots will be successful in controlling them.
Daniel Schoedinger

